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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are in a car accident, and the other driver sues you for 
negligence.  Not knowing any lawyers, you search the Internet and hire a 
local attorney who describes himself as the best defense attorney in the state, 
is not terribly expensive, and seems to be a nice enough guy.  You sit back, 
relax, and try to be as patient as possible while your new lawyer clears your 
name. 
However, just as you start to feel confident that your case will finally 
come to a favorable conclusion, you receive a letter in the mail from the 
county courthouse alerting you that you owe $50,000 in damages to the 
person who sued you.  You try to contact your attorney to see what 
happened—when hired, he assured you that he would take care of 
everything and that you needn’t worry about the proceedings—but he can no 
longer be found.  You finally drive to the courthouse and ask the clerk why 
you owe so much money.  The clerk informs you that the opposing party 
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking $50,000, but your attorney did 
not appear on your behalf at the hearing on the motion.  Consequently, the 
judge entered a default judgment against you,1 and you are forced to pay the 
damages sought by the opposing party. 
You try to sue your attorney for malpractice, but upon inspection, you 
find out that he has no insurance.  So, in a last-ditch effort to stem the tide of 
impending debt, you hire new counsel and ask a judge to vacate the default 
judgment on the grounds that your previous attorney did not sufficiently 
represent you.2  The judge upholds the default judgment, and you confusedly 
ask your new attorney exactly how the judge could rule that way. 
 
 1. A default judgment is “[a] judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to plead or 
otherwise defend against the plaintiff’s claim.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2. Courts can vacate judgments and orders by utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  This topic will be taken up in more detail in Part II.B–C. 
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“The judge couldn’t do anything about it,” your new attorney responds.  
“The law says that you are bound by your first attorney’s actions since you 
voluntarily chose to hire him.  I’m sorry, but you have to pay that money.” 
Although a court ruling such as this may seem to be unfair and an overly 
literal interpretation of the principles of a society that values an adversarial 
legal system, it is not entirely uncommon.3  Some courts have held that an 
attorney’s misconduct can never be used as a basis for vacating a civil 
judgment, and, as such, that a client is always bound by the acts of an 
attorney who has represented him.4  Moreover, other courts have explicitly 
refused to address the question whether attorney misconduct can provide a 
ground for vacating civil judgments, often leaving clients in the same 
position they would have been in had the court explicitly stated that they 
were bound by their attorneys’ actions.5  The result is that many clients are 
left without a remedy they can resort to in order to get relief from judgments 
entered against them when they had been represented by terribly deficient 
attorneys.6 
The Supreme Court, however, recently decided two cases that give hope 
to clients afflicted with incompetent attorneys.7  In Holland v. Florida and 
Maples v. Thomas, cases involving two different habeas corpus petitioners, 
the Court outlined a standard known as “attorney abandonment,” which 
effectively states that clients are not bound by the acts or omissions of 
attorneys who have abandoned them.8  Although created in a criminal 
procedure context, attorney abandonment must logically extend to the civil 
realm,9 a consequence that means all federal courts in civil cases must 
necessarily have the power to relieve abandoned clients from the conduct—
or lack thereof—of their absent attorneys.10  This Article argues that Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (Rule 60(b)(6)) is the only remedy that 
courts can always rely on to enforce this power.11  The universal availability 
 
 3. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part II.C.2. 
 4. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 5. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 6. See, e.g., Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ll of the attorney’s misconduct . . . becomes the problem of the client.”). 
 7. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
 8. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; Holland, 560 U.S. 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
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of this statutory rule, which states that courts can vacate judgments against 
parties “for any . . . reason that justifies relief,”12 ensures that courts can 
safeguard clients from the conduct of attorneys who have abandoned them.13 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the distinct models the 
Supreme Court has utilized to evaluate attorney misconduct and the 
circumstances that bind clients to that misconduct.14  Part II also describes in 
detail the uses of Rule 60(b)(6) and the circuit split prior to Holland and 
Maples concerning the interaction between Rule 60(b)(6) and attorney 
misconduct.15  Part III thoroughly analyzes Holland, Maples, and the 
attorney abandonment standard these two cases jointly created.16  Part IV 
contends that the Supreme Court likely intended for this attorney 
abandonment standard to apply in the civil context.17  Part V consequently 
argues that whenever a court finds that a client was abandoned in a civil suit, 
Holland and Maples mandate that the court must necessarily have the power 
to vacate any judgment against that client by utilizing Rule 60(b)(6).18  Part 
VI returns to the circuit split described in Part II, shows how the circuit split 
is cured when courts always have the ability to vacate judgments against 
abandoned clients by utilizing Rule 60(b)(6), and outlines how each of the 
circuits must alter their jurisprudence to reflect Holland and Maples.19  Part 
VII acknowledges some lingering questions that Congress and future courts 
must answer because of Holland and Maples.20  Part VIII concludes.21 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT, RULE 60(b)(6), AND THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT CAUSED BY THEIR INTERACTION 
A. The Historical Models for Attorney Misconduct in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has traditionally employed two distinct analytical 
 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
 13. See infra Parts V–VI. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See infra Part VI. 
 20. See infra Part VII. 
 21. See infra Part VIII. 
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models when deciding issues of attorney misconduct22: the performance-
based model23 and the relationship-based model.24  Generally, the Court has 
used the performance-based model only when a criminal defendant is 
guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.25  Conversely, 
when a person is not guaranteed this right to counsel—including any person 
that is a party to a civil lawsuit—the Court has used the relationship-based 
model.26 
1. The Performance-Based Model 
The performance-based model “evaluates the level and quality of work 
an attorney has done on a client’s behalf.”27  The focal point of this model is 
just as it sounds: the performance of the client’s attorney.28  If the attorney’s 
conduct falls below a certain level of reasonable acceptability,29 then the 
client will no longer be bound by the attorney’s actions.30  If, however, the 
 
 22. Wendy Zorana Zupac, Note, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating Claims of 
Attorney Misconduct After Maples v. Thomas, 122 YALE L.J. 1328, 1335 (2013). 
 23. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 25. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332.  Because the right to counsel only attaches to criminal 
defendants, the performance-based model is outside the scope of this Article: Rule 60(b)(6) only 
applies to civil lawsuits, where a party does not have a guaranteed right to counsel.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI.  For that reason, this Article will only briefly discuss the performance-based model.  See 
infra Part II.A.1. 
 26. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332.    
 27. Id. at 1335. 
 28. Id. at 1337. 
 29. This level of reasonable acceptability was first described in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The Strickland standard states the following: 
  A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective . . . has two 
components.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id.  Put differently, the attorney’s performance must fall “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” as governed by “prevailing professional norms,” and it must have actually 
prejudiced the defendant in some way.  Id. at 688. 
 30. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1337; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that when 
criminal defendants meet both requirements of the Strickland standard, they will not be bound by the 
deficient conduct of their attorneys). 
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attorney’s conduct is not sufficiently deficient, then the client will remain 
bound by the attorney’s actions.31 
 The Supreme Court has only used the performance-based model when a 
defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.32  Because the Sixth Amendment only applies 
to criminal defendants,33 the Court has held that the right to counsel—and 
therefore the performance-based model—only applies in a very limited 
number of situations.34  Notably, this means that the Court has never, and 
will never, use the performance-based model to decide matters of attorney 
misconduct in civil cases.35 
2. The Relationship-Based Model 
On the other hand, the relationship-based model “examines the nature of 
the relationship between the lawyer and the client.”36  It is based on agency 
 
 31. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1337; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 32. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“So 
long as a defendant [who is guaranteed the right to counsel] is represented by counsel whose 
performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. A criminal defendant has a right to counsel in all felony cases and in his first appeal of right.  
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him.”); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the 
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, 
we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”).  However, a criminal 
defendant does not have a right to counsel in “appeals to the state’s highest court or in filing a 
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.”  Zupac, supra note 22, at 1334; see also 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616–17 (1974) (“This Court’s review, much like that of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, is discretionary . . . .”).  Furthermore, a criminal defendant can mount a 
“collateral attack” in a state trial court for postconviction relief and also petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the appropriate federal district court.  Zupac, supra note 22, at 1334.  In these situations, 
the criminal defendant is also not guaranteed a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  See 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . .”). 
 35. See Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332.  This has bearing on Rule 60(b)(6) because the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure only apply in civil lawsuits.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).  Accordingly, Rule 
60(b)(6) will never implicate the performance-based model.  See infra Part II.A.2 (describing how 
the relationship-based model will always govern in civil cases). 
 36. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1335. 
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law and premised on the fact that the attorney is the agent of the client.37  
Therefore, under this model, clients traditionally remain bound by their 
attorney’s conduct regardless of the degree of the attorney’s negligence.38 
The relationship-based model was first articulated in Link v. Wabash 
Railroad Co.,39 a Supreme Court case arising out of a civil lawsuit in which 
the Court established the general rule that clients should be held responsible 
for their attorneys’ conduct regardless of how negligent the conduct was.40  
In deciding the case, the Court reasoned: 
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the 
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or 
omissions of this freely selected agent.  Any other notion would be 
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in 
which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-
agent . . . .41 
The Court later reaffirmed this general rule in Coleman v. Thompson,42 
 
 37. Id. at 1137; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an 
‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and 
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 38. Prior to the Court’s decisions in Holland and Maples, attorney abandonment was available to 
relieve clients from the conduct of their negligent attorneys under the relationship-based model in 
only some circuits.  See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3, III.  As such, before these two decisions, and 
depending on the court, clients were sometimes completely bound by their attorneys’ conduct in 
situations where the relationship-based model governed.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 39. 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
 40. See id. at 633–34.  Link involved a collision between Link’s car and one of Wabash’s trains.  
Id. at 627.  Six years after this collision, the district court scheduled a pretrial conference to take 
place on October 12.  Id.  At 10:45 a.m. on the day of the pretrial conference, Link’s attorney phoned 
Wabash’s attorney and told him that he would not be at the pretrial hearing because he was in 
Indianapolis “preparing papers to file with the (Indiana) Supreme Court.”  Id. at 627–28.  Link’s 
attorney did, however, notify both the opposing attorney and the court that he could be available the 
next day if the pretrial conference could be rescheduled.  Id. at 628.  After waiting for two hours, the 
district court dismissed the action because Link’s counsel failed to provide a reasonable basis for not 
appearing.  Id. at 628–29.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal.  Id. at 629. 
 41. Id. at 633–34. 
 42. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).  Roger Coleman was convicted of rape and capital murder in Buchanan 
County, Virginia, and he was sentenced to death.  Id. at 726–27.  The Virginia Supreme Court 
affirmed both the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
certiorari.  Id. at 727.  Thereafter, Coleman filed a collateral attack in Buchanan County Court 
alleging several habeas corpus claims.  Id.  After several days of review, the court ruled against 
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where it held that agency principles—and therefore the relationship-based 
model43—apply in cases where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does 
not arise.44  In so ruling, the Court noted that using a performance-based 
model in such situations “would be contrary to well-settled principles of 
agency law.”45  Consequently, the Coleman ruling, combined with the 
underlying reasoning in Link,46 established a relationship-based model for 
measuring attorney misconduct in all civil cases and in criminal appeals 
where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not apply.47 
The Link and Coleman decisions, however, have not been received 
without scrutiny.48  In fact, many circuit courts have tried to lessen the 
 
Coleman on each claim.  Id.  Coleman filed a notice of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, but 
Coleman did so thirty-three days after the Buchanan County Court entered judgment.  Id.  The 
Virginia Supreme Court rules mandated that notices of appeal must be filed within thirty days of a 
judgment.  Id.  For that reason, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.  Id.  After filing 
another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Coleman’s case eventually came before 
the United States Supreme Court, which established the rule described above in the accompanying 
text.  Id. at 728–29, 753. 
 43. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the principles of the 
relationship-based model. 
 44. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1342; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“Attorney ignorance or 
inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to 
act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” (quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986))).  Once again, Coleman involved a situation where the 
client did not have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  See supra note 42.  Accordingly, 
it can reasonably be inferred that the Coleman Court meant for the relationship-based model to apply 
only in cases where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not arise, especially because the 
Court explicitly mentioned Murray and its use of the performance-based model.  See Coleman, 501 
U.S. at 754 (“[A]s [Murray] explains, ‘if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the 
State.’  In other words, it is not the gravity of the attorney’s error that matters, but that it constitutes 
a violation of petitioner’s right to [effective assistance of] counsel . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
 45. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 242 (1958)). 
 46. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 47. A relationship-based model will therefore apply, for example, in collateral attacks and 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  See supra note 34. 
 48. In Link, Justice Black strongly dissented to the majority’s ruling because he believed it was 
too extreme and inflexible.  See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 644–55 (1962) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“One may readily accept the statement that there are circumstances under which a client 
is responsible for the acts or omissions of his attorney.  But it stretches this generalized statement too 
far to say that he must always do that.”).  Furthermore, Justice Blackmun authored a strong dissent 
against the majority opinion in Coleman, stating that “the Court’s determination that ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot constitute cause of a procedural default in a state postconviction 
proceeding is patently unfair.”  501 U.S. at 774 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
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seemingly inflexible nature of the relationship-based model and the often-
unjust effects it has on clients by resorting to the courts’ equitable powers.49  
The weapon of choice employed by these courts is Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(6).50 
B. Rule 60(b)(6) as a Potential Tool 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) gives a court the power to 
“relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding.”51  Obviously, such a broad grant of power, if unchecked, could 
be a potential ground for abuse and could give judges too much discretion in 
the outcome of a case.52  Therefore, Rule 60(b) provides that relief from a 
judgment is only appropriate for one of six reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);53 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed 
or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) 
any other reason that justifies relief.54 
While courts have the power to vacate judgments under Rule 60(b), they 
 
 49. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1362; see also infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3. 
 50. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1362; see also infra Parts II.B–C.1, II.C.3. 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 52. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981) (“This is not to say that 
final judgments should be lightly reopened.  The desirability of order and predictability in the 
judicial process calls for the exercise of caution in [Rule 60(b)] matters.” (citing Fackelman v. Bell, 
564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977))). 
 53. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) states that “[a] motion for a new trial must be filed no 
later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  In addition to proving one of these six categories, the moving party 
must file the motion for relief within a reasonable time.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c) (“A motion under 
Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a 
year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”).  For the purposes of 
this Article, however, a discussion of this time requirement is unnecessary. 
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are not mandated to do so.55  Indeed, the rule itself was created so that courts 
could balance “the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an 
end and that justice should be done.”56  That being the case, courts generally 
apply Rule 60(b) liberally when it involves a case that has not been heard on 
its merits or when the movant has a meritorious defense.57 
But a much stricter standard applies when the sixth clause of Rule 60(b) 
is at issue.58  A type of “catchall” provision,59 Rule 60(b)(6) gives a court the 
power to vacate a judgment “whenever that action is appropriate to 
accomplish justice.”60  It was added as part of the 1948 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,61 and it has been described as “an 
unprecedented addition to the Rules” because of its broad reach.62  This 
broad reach, however, is counteracted by a stringent standard for use entitled 
the “extraordinary circumstances” test.63  Essentially, the test requires that if 
relief would have initially been available under one of the first five clauses 
of Rule 60(b), then Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used unless the movant can 
show that extraordinary circumstances are present.64 
 
 55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its 
legal representative . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Therefore, situations arise where it would be 
inequitable to either grant or deny relief.  See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362, 
364 (10th Cir. 1939) (“An application to open, vacate, or set aside a judgment is within the sound 
legal discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by an appellate court except for 
a clear abuse of discretion.  It is an abuse of discretion, however, to open or vacate a judgment where 
the moving party shows no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his own negligence or 
default.”); Hopkins v. Coen, 431 F.2d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[W]here verdicts in the same 
case are inconsistent on their faces, indicating that the jury was either in a state of confusion or 
abused its power, a motion to alter or amend a judgment, for new trial, or for relief from the 
judgment, if timely made, is not discretionary.”). 
 56. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2851 (3d ed. 
2014). 
 57. Id. § 2857. 
 58. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 59. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2857. 
 60. Id. § 2864. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 81 (1952).   
 63. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864. 
 64. Id.  To be even more precise, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is much more 
nuanced than the “extraordinary circumstances” test suggests.  See id.  First, the “extraordinary 
circumstances” test generally only applies when relief is sought a year after a judgment has been 
entered.  Id.  This is due to the fact that it is generally not difficult to apply Rule 60(b) when relief is 
sought within a year because “it is not important to decide whether the motion in fact comes under 
clause (6) or under one of the earlier clauses.”  Id.  However, because the time requirement of Rule 
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What constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” has been a source of 
disagreement among the courts.65  It is a fairly unclear standard that has been 
found to apply in only several situations.66  One of the biggest examples of 
such a disagreement to emerge among the courts is whether attorney 
misconduct can qualify as an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6).67  On one hand, Rule 60(b)(6) would seem to be an 
ideal tool for such a situation because it would relieve helpless clients from 
judgments that resulted from the incompetent acts of their attorneys.68  On 
the other hand, the relationship-based model established by the Supreme 
 
60 is outside the scope of this Article, see supra note 54, this Article will assume for the purposes of 
simplicity that any ground for relief under Rule 60(b), regardless of whether or not it was brought 
within a year, invokes the extraordinary circumstances test.  For a more detailed discussion of the 
time requirements of Rule 60(b)(6), see WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864. 
  Second, the “extraordinary circumstances” test is not the only test that the Supreme Court 
uses: it also employs the “other reasons” test.  See id.  The “other reasons” test, unlike the 
“extraordinary circumstances” test, states that “if the movant clearly demonstrates some ‘other 
reason’ justifying relief outside of the earlier [five] clauses in the rule, then the ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ test is not invoked.”  Id.  In other words, the “extraordinary circumstances” test arises 
when one of the earlier five clauses of Rule 60(b) is invoked, but the “other reasons” test applies 
when one of the earlier five clauses is not invoked.  See id.  In reality, however, the difference 
between these two tests is likely a legal fiction: the “other reasons” that courts have found to satisfy 
the “other reasons” test “are more likely egregious forms of conduct covered under another clause of 
Rule 60(b).”  Id.  That is, these “other reasons” are simply the most extraordinary of the 
extraordinary circumstances.  See id.  For example—and highly relevant to this Article—one of 
these “other reasons” that courts have found is attorney abandonment.  Id.  A regular attorney 
blunder would generally “fit readily within the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect set out in clause (1)” of Rule 60(b).  Id.  However, when attorney misconduct becomes so 
egregious so as to constitute abandonment, some courts have held that Rule 60(b)(6) is a ground for 
relief.  See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3.  Viewed from this perspective, attorney abandonment is simply 
an extension of a mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) that evolved into an extraordinary circumstance 
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  See WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864.  Therefore, for the sake 
of simplicity and consistency, this Article assumes that only the “extraordinary circumstances” test 
governs because, in reality, it is essentially the same as the “other reasons” test.  See id. 
 65. See WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2851 (noting that cases decided under Rule 60(b)(6) have been 
in conflict and inconsistent).  Even more frustrating is that courts have muddled the jurisprudence of 
the first five clauses under Rule 60(b) with the jurisprudence that should have been restricted to 
clause Rule 60(b)(6) alone.  Id. § 2857.  As a result, the entire case law surrounding Rule 60(b) is a 
rather confusing area for courts.  See id. 
 66. These situations include, for example, “cases in which there was inaction by the government 
and unusual delays by the courts, and when there is a strong public interest in the case and the 
conduct of the parties is egregious.”  Id. § 2864; see also, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition 
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968); Bros, 
Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 609–10 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 67. See infra Part II.C. 
 68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
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Court in Link and Coleman would seem to stand, at least at first glance, as a 
firm roadblock to such relief.69  As a result, the circuit courts have developed 
four distinct approaches to tackle this problem.70 
C. The Circuit Split over Rule 60(b)(6) as a Remedy for Attorney 
Misconduct 
1. The Gross Negligence Circuits 
Some circuit courts have held that gross attorney negligence satisfies 
Rule 60(b)(6).71  The reasoning of these courts is that in situations where the 
first five clauses of Rule 60(b) should apply but cannot,72 extreme 
misconduct by an attorney that exceeds ordinary negligence and goes so far 
as to qualify as “gross negligence”73 is sufficiently “extraordinary” to qualify 
for relief under clause (6).74  Notably, attorney abandonment is not a 
 
 69. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 70. See infra Part II.C.  
 71. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002); Boughner v. 
Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3rd Cir. 1978) (“We reverse, however, on the 
basis that the motion to vacate should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(6).  The conduct of [the 
lawyer] indicates neglect so gross that it is inexcusable.” (emphasis added)); Jackson v. Wash. 
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is 
appropriate when an attorney acts “grossly rather than just mildly negligent toward his client”).  It is 
also likely that the Sixth Circuit follows this standard even though it does not explicitly use the term 
“gross negligence.”  See Fuller v. Quire, 916 F.2d 358, 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief for plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(6) for the 
“inexcusable misconduct of his attorney” when the lawyer did not appear on behalf of the client at 
hearings and would not respond to the client’s inquiries).  The Fourth Circuit, meanwhile, has never 
explicitly vacated a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on alleged attorney misconduct, but it has 
suggested that it would likely follow the gross negligence standard if it did.  See Smith v. Bounds, 
813 F.2d 1299, 1304–05 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that an attorney’s neglect was so deplorable that it 
would likely warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), but denying relief on different grounds). 
 72. This would mainly be in a situation where the one-year statute of limitations under Rule 
60(c) had ran in full and a client could no longer seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for her attorney’s 
misconduct.  See supra note 54.  However, as previously stated, the time requirement is outside the 
scope of this Article, so it will be taken for granted that the first step of the “extraordinary 
circumstances” test is satisfied.  See supra note 64. 
 73. Gross negligence arises when “the element of culpability which characterizes all negligence 
is magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence.”  57A AM. JUR. 
2D Negligence § 227 (2014). 
 74. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864; see also infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text.   
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requirement per se in these circuits.75  While verdicts granting relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6) in these courts can and often do involve attorney 
abandonment, these courts can also theoretically grant relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) where the attorney acted grossly negligent but did not abandon his 
client.76  In this regard, these circuit courts have the most flexible approach 
to the interaction between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6).77 
In Community Dental Services v. Tani,78 for instance, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the majority of the other circuits and held that an attorney’s gross 
negligence is an extraordinary circumstance that is a ground for equitable 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6).79  Tani involved a lawsuit for trademark 
infringement by Community Dental Services (CDS) against Stuart Tani.80  
Tani’s counsel repeatedly failed to give a copy of Tani’s answer to the 
complaint to CDS, missed court-ordered conference calls, and failed to file a 
written memorandum in opposition to CDS’s motion for a default 
judgment.81  As a result of this non-responsiveness, the trial court granted a 
default judgment against Tani.82  Tani subsequently sought out a new lawyer 
 
 75. See, e.g., Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 (holding that a client need only “demonstrate[] gross 
negligence on the part of his counsel” to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)).  To be sure, the 
court made no mention that a party must prove attorney abandonment in any form, see id., even 
though in this particular case the court decided that the attorney “virtually abandoned” his client.  Id. 
at 1170; see also infra notes 78–90 and accompanying text. 
 76.  See, e.g., Jackson, 569 F.2d at 122.  In Jackson, the court held that the fact that the attorney 
“misled the client by reassuring him that the litigation was continuing smoothly when in fact it was 
suffering severely from lack of attention” was a factor that supported granting relief under Rule 
60(b)(6).  Id.  The court never characterized this conduct as any type of “abandonment,” but it still 
found that the lawyer acted in a grossly negligent manner that demanded relief.  Id. at 122–23. 
  However, this distinction between gross negligence and attorney abandonment is likely only 
a legal fiction because, in reality, any type of gross attorney negligence that justifies relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6) can also be characterized as attorney abandonment.  Compare id., with Tani, 282 F.3d 
at 1170–71 (holding that an attorney “virtually abandoned” his client when the lawyer told the client 
that the case was proceeding properly when, in reality, it was proceeding abysmally).  The 
implications of these holdings in light of Holland and Maples are discussed in further detail in Part 
VI.A. 
 77. See infra Part II.C.2–3 for a discussion of stricter approaches. 
 78. This case was chosen because of its clear and detailed reasoning of the court’s decision to 
allow Rule 60(b)(6) as grounds for relief for egregious attorney misconduct.  See infra notes 85–90 
and accompanying text.  Cases from other circuits have held similarly and are also insightful.  See 
supra note 71. 
 79. 282 F.3d at 1169. 
 80. Id. at 1166. 
 81. Id. at 1167. 
 82. Id. 
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and brought a new lawsuit seeking relief from the default judgment.83  The 
district court denied relief, reasoning that “the acts and omissions of 
counsel . . . were chargeable to Tani.”84 
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
“judgment by default is an extreme measure” and that cases should be 
decided on the merits whenever possible.85  More importantly, the court 
explicitly referenced Link and held that it “does not serve as a barrier to 
establishing the rule that gross negligence by a party’s counsel may 
constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under Rule 60(b)(6).”86  According 
to the court, this was because “the [Link] Court expressly declined to state 
whether it would have held that the district court abused its discretion if the 
issue had arisen in the context of a motion under Rule 60(b).”87  The Tani 
court thus took advantage of the Supreme Court’s indecision regarding 
equitable relief and explicitly held that Rule 60(b)(6) can be used by a client 
for relief from her attorney’s conduct so long as that conduct was grossly 
negligent.88  Applying this new rule to the case at hand, the court noted that 
the attorney’s gross negligence was so extreme that he “virtually 
abandoned” Tani.89  The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held that the default 
judgment should be vacated.90 
2. The No Relief Circuits 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held that Rule 60(b)(6) is 
not an appropriate basis for relief from attorney misconduct no matter how 
egregiously the attorney has acted.91  The logic behind this is that even if an 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  In other words, the court was relying on the relationship-based model espoused by the 
Supreme Court in Link and Coleman.  See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2. 
 85. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 635–36 (1962)). 
 88. Id.  The court noted that gross negligence “signif[ies] a greater, and less excusable, degree of 
negligence” when compared with ordinary negligence.  Id.  In light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Maples and Holland, gross negligence can be equated with attorney abandonment in 
most, but not all, cases.  See supra note 76 and infra Parts III, VI.A. 
 89. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1994).  It is also likely that the First Circuit currently 
holds this position, although it has not closed the possibility of changing its jurisprudence.  See KPS 
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attorney’s performance is abysmal, the relationship-based model outlined in 
Link and Coleman bars any consideration of Rule 60(b)(6) as an avenue to 
relief.92 
The first time the Seventh Circuit explicitly expressed this view was in 
United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue.93  In this case, the Federal 
Government began forfeiture proceedings against three parcels of property 
belonging to a husband and wife.94  The attorney retained by the couple 
failed to file timely claims on behalf of the husband for any of the three 
properties and only filed a timely claim on behalf of the wife for one of the 
properties.95  The situation worsened when the trial court granted a motion 
for default judgment against the couple after neither the lawyer nor the wife 
appeared at the hearing for the motion.96  Accordingly, the couple, with the 
help of new counsel, attempted to seek relief from the default judgment by 
utilizing Rule 60(b) and claiming that their previous attorney had acted in a 
grossly negligent manner.97 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision not to allow the 
 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Designs By FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the First 
Circuit has always “turned a deaf ear to the plea that the sins of the attorney should not be visited 
upon the client” but that any potential exception to this general rule would have to be decided in a 
future case (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Nonetheless, two important points should be noted: 
First, the First Circuit has not decided a case since KPS & Associates that addresses the interaction 
between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6), so its jurisprudence in this area is not as clear and 
developed as that of the Seventh Circuit.  See infra notes 98–101, 107–11 and accompanying text.  
Second, the Seventh Circuit is more “famous” than the First Circuit for having this viewpoint.  See 
Zupac, supra note 22, at 1363 n.201.  As such, this Article will focus on the Seventh Circuit.  See 
infra notes 93–111. 
 92. See, e.g., 7180 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 634 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633–34) (“The clients 
are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his 
chosen agent’s deeds.  So much is clear for an attorney’s wilful misconduct.”). 
 93. Id. at 635.  However, even before this case was decided, the Seventh Circuit had many 
suspicions about using Rule 60(b)(6) to grant relief for attorney misconduct.  See, e.g., Nelson v. 
City Colls. of Chi., 962 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We do not definitively address whether a 
diligent client would be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for the gross negligence of his 
counsel . . . .  Nevertheless, we continue to cast serious doubt on the theory that an attorney’s gross 
negligence warrants relief under Rule 60(b).”); United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1496 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (“It seems clear to us that the law in this circuit is that an attorney’s conduct must be 
imputed to his client in any context.”).   
 94. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 633. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
  97. Id. 
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use of Rule 60(b) to provide relief for the attorney’s gross misconduct.98  In 
so deciding, the court, citing Link, noted that both simple negligence and 
intentional acts of an attorney are imputed to a client based on agency 
principles;99 therefore, attempting to use Rule 60(b) to draw a line between 
simple negligence and gross negligence was unnecessary because “the 
answer [would] not make any difference.”100  The result of this decision was 
that the Seventh Circuit effectively precluded gross attorney negligence from 
being considered as an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under 
Rule 60(b)(6).101 
In Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.,102 
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding from 7108 West Grand Avenue 
and extended it past gross negligence to include situations of intentional 
attorney deception.103  The case involved an attorney representing Bakery 
Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. (BMF) who repeatedly told BMF for nine 
months that things were “going well” in an ongoing lawsuit with Traditional 
Baking, Inc. (TBI).104  In reality, things were not going well: the attorney 
failed to make appearances at hearings, repeatedly neglected to respond to 
court filings and motions presented to BMF by TBI, and refused to comply 
with court orders in the lawsuit.105  The district court entered a default 
judgment against BMF, which moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 
60(b)(6) once it discovered the attorney’s deception.106 
In upholding the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate,107 the 
Seventh Circuit held that the ruling in 7108 West Grand Avenue that 
 
 98. Id. at 634–35.   
 99. Id. at 634.  
 100. Id. at 635.  The court further expressed a policy concern that using Rule 60(b) to shield 
clients from the conduct of their attorneys “would create a land office business in gross negligence.”  
Id. at 634.  In other words, the court feared that using Rule 60(b) in attorney-misconduct cases would 
create an incentive for attorneys to act negligently.  See id. (quoting Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786 
F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1986)) (“If the lawyer’s neglect protected the client from ill consequences, 
neglect would become all too common.  It would be a free good—the neglect would protect the 
client, and because the client could not suffer the lawyer would not suffer either.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 101. Id. at 635. 
 102. 570 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 103. Id. at 848. 
 104. Id. at 847. 
 105. Id. at 846–47.   
 106. Id. at 847.  
 107. Id.  
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mistakes of an attorney are imputed to the client goes so far as to apply to 
situations in which the attorney intentionally deceived the client.108  Indeed, 
the court stated that “all of the attorney’s misconduct (except in the cases 
where the act is outside the scope of employment or in cases of excusable 
neglect) becomes the problem of the client.”109  While the court recognized 
BMF’s dire position,110 the court also viewed the fact that “BMF voluntarily 
chose [the attorney]” as dispositive.111 
3. The Strict Abandonment Circuits 
Several circuit courts have adopted an intermediate approach that 
requires a stricter standard than gross negligence but does not preclude relief 
entirely like the Seventh Circuit mandates.112  Specifically, these circuits 
require attorney abandonment in order to find a basis for relief under Rule 
60(b)(6).113  The result is that decisions in these courts are often the same as 
those in the “gross negligence” courts, but the reasoning that is used to get 
to those decisions is different.114 
For example, consider the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Cirami, in which the United States brought an action against a couple for 
collection of unpaid taxes.115  While the couple’s attorney filed a very brief 
answer to the Government’s initial complaint, he failed to show up at the 
hearing on the Government’s motion for summary judgment.116  The 
 
 108. Id. at 848. 
 109. Id.  As will be seen, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, as evidenced by this quote in particular, 
left a small but clear opening for attorney abandonment to take root as an exception to the general 
rule that clients are bound by the acts of their attorneys.  See infra Part VI.B. 
 110. Specifically, the court noted that BMF could not seek an alternative redress by directly suing 
the attorney because the attorney lacked malpractice insurance.  Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 849.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Heim v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 872 F.2d 245, 248–49 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the gross negligence of an attorney does not satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) but “leaving his 
clients unrepresented” would); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (“The usual 
understanding of the attorney-client agency relationship, however, should not bar relief under Rule 
60(b) when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one.” (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 113. See cases cited supra note 112; see also infra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.  
Compare this with the “gross negligence” courts, which do not require a client to prove attorney 
abandonment.  See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 115. Cirami, 563 F.2d at 29. 
 116. Id.  
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Government’s motion was thereby granted, and the couple, with the help of 
new counsel, brought a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the judgment.117  
Upon review, the district court determined that the previous attorney had 
been suffering from a mental disorder that affected his representation of the 
couple and that the couple had unsuccessfully attempted to contact him 
several times about the status of the motion for summary judgment.118  Even 
with these facts, the trial court refused to grant the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.119 
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court and held that 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief was appropriate.120  In so doing, it noted the “unique fact 
of what we may term the ‘constructive disappearance’ of [the couple’s] 
attorney” because his mental disorder “led him to neglect almost completely 
his clients’ business.”121  The court stated that it was this constructive 
disappearance that set the couple’s situation apart from the general rule 
established in Link.122  The court explained that the couple’s “allegations set 
up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as 
mere neglect.”123  Notably, the court never mentioned “gross negligence” in 
any context in explaining its decision.124  Instead, it focused on attorney 
abandonment—a concept that it labeled “constructive disappearance”—as 
the necessary standard that a party must prove to exempt itself from the acts 
of its attorney.125 
4. The Unclear Circuits 
Finally, the Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have never 
ruled on attorney misconduct and its interplay with Rule 60(b)(6), and it is 
unclear what standard they would follow if they were ever to do so.126  For 
 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 31.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 33.  
 121. Id. at 34. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 35 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1940)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
 124. See id. at 33–35 (omitting any discussion of gross negligence). 
 125. Id. at 34. 
 126. See, e.g., Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 2012) (ignoring the question of 
whether attorney misconduct satisfied Rule 60(b)(6) because the governing question was whether a 
“change in decisional law” from the time of conviction to the time of appeal constituted an 
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instance, consider the case of Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-
Energy Systems, Inc., in which Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corporation, Inc. 
(Solaroll) brought a trademark infringement action against Bio-Energy 
Systems (BES).127  The case settled, but several years later Solaroll filed a 
motion to reinstate the action on the grounds that BES was not complying 
with the settlement agreement.128  BES, however, never responded to this 
motion or appeared at the hearing on the motion, and the court therefore 
granted the motion in default.129  With the help of new counsel, BES sought 
to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) by alleging attorney 
misconduct.130  The district court denied the motion to vacate.131 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and 
held that even though some courts had vacated judgments under Rule 
60(b)(6) based on gross attorney negligence, the attorney’s conduct in the 
case at hand had not risen to that level.132  Therefore, the court did not decide 
whether Rule 60(b)(6) could be used for attorney error because the result 
would not matter.133  The court did not even indicate what standard it might 
apply if Rule 60(b)(6) could be used.134 
III. ACKNOWLEDGING ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT LAID THE GROUNDWORK THAT WILL SOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether attorney 
misconduct can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6), it has ruled on attorney misconduct 
and its effect on clients in the criminal context.135  In two recent decisions, 
 
extraordinary circumstance); Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 
1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 1986); Thunder Mountain Custom Cycles, Inc. v. Thiessen Prods., Inc., No. 
06-cv-02527-PAB-BNB, 2008 WL 5412463, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2008) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit 
has not spoken on the issue of Rule 60(b)(6) relief for gross and inexcusable neglect by a party’s 
attorney . . . .”).  It seems that the Federal Circuit never even addressed the concepts prior to Holland 
and Maples. 
 127. Solaroll Shade, 803 F.2d at 1131.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1133.   
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. (omitting any discussion of what standard the court would likely apply if Rule 
60(b)(6) could be used for attorney misconduct). 
 135. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).  
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Holland v. Florida and Maples v. Thomas, the Court acknowledged and 
established a concept known as “attorney abandonment” for habeas corpus 
petitioners.136  Essentially, this doctrine mandates that a client who was 
effectively abandoned by her attorney should not be held responsible for the 
attorney’s actions.137  As will be seen, the rulings in these two Supreme 
Court cases effectively eliminate the circuit split over attorney misconduct 
and its application to Rule 60(b)(6).138 
A. Holland v. Florida 
Holland v. Florida involved a man named Albert Holland who was 
convicted of first-degree murder in 1997.139  After the Supreme Court denied 
Holland’s petition for certiorari, Holland had exactly one year to file for 
postconviction relief in either state or federal court.140  To facilitate this 
process, Florida appointed counsel to represent Holland in these 
postconviction proceedings.141  With only twelve days remaining in the one-
year statute of limitations, the state-appointed counsel filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in state court.142  This motion remained pending in state 
court for three years.143  During this time, Holland wrote his attorney letters 
indicating his desire that the attorney preserve any and all claims he might 
have for subsequent federal habeas corpus review and to update him on any 
proceedings in his case.144  Over this three-year period, however, the attorney 
responded to Holland’s requests only three times and did so only in 
writing.145  Holland, frustrated with this sparse communication, twice 
 
 136.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 137. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring); Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924.   
 138. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
 139. Holland, 560 U.S. at 635. 
 140. Id.; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(d)(1) (2012) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). 
 141. Holland, 560 U.S. at 635–36. 
 142. Id. at 636.  This meant that if Holland’s claim for postconviction relief was unsuccessful in 
state court, he would have only twelve days left to file a claim for postconviction relief in federal 
court.  See id. at 638.  In other words, the one-year statute of limitations period does not “restart” 
upon denial of relief in state court.  See id. 
 143. Id.  This included proceedings at both the Florida trial court level and at the Florida Supreme 
Court.  Id. at 636–38. 
 144. Id. at 636. 
 145. Id. 
[Vol. 42: 155, 2014] The Universal Remedy for Attorney Abandonment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
175 
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court pro se to remove the attorney from his 
case and to appoint new counsel.146  In response, the Florida Supreme Court 
told Holland that he “could not file any pro se papers with the court while he 
was represented by counsel, including papers seeking new counsel.”147 
Once the Florida Supreme Court denied Holland any postconviction 
relief, his counsel had only twelve days to file a habeas corpus petition in 
federal court.148  Not surprisingly, his counsel failed to file the proper 
paperwork within this time period.149  Holland was unaware that a final 
decision had been rendered in his case until five weeks after the statute of 
limitations had expired; nevertheless, he submitted his federal habeas 
petition pro se as soon as he became informed of the Florida Supreme 
Court’s final decision.150  The federal district court denied this petition on the 
grounds that it had not been filed within the proper statute of limitations 
period.151  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.152 
The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus petitions could be 
equitably tolled to overcome the one-year statute of limitations and that 
Holland’s habeas petition may have been timely if there were extraordinary 
circumstances that justified equitable tolling.153  In so deciding, the Court 
 
 146. Id. at 637. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 638; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 149. Holland, 560 U.S. at 638–39. 
 150. Id. at 639. 
 151. Id. at 643–44. 
 152. Id. at 644. 
 153. Id. at 649.  Equitable tolling “allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of 
limitations deadline” if doing so is necessary to accomplish justice based on the specific 
circumstances of the case.  51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2013).  Generally, a habeas 
petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that he has been diligently pursuing his rights and 
that some extraordinary circumstance made it impossible for him to enforce them.  39 AM. JUR. 2D 
Habeas Corpus § 121 (2013).  It should be noted that equitable tolling is not a pertinent issue to this 
Article overall.  See supra Part I.  Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court began to mold its 
concept of attorney abandonment in the framework of a case mainly concerned with equitable 
tolling, it is of importance in the specific context of Holland v. Florida.  See Holland, 560 U.S. at 
654–60 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the interaction between attorney abandonment and 
equitable tolling); see also infra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
   Furthermore, the Supreme Court declined to “state [its] conclusion in absolute form” because 
it recognized that it is a court of review and not a court of first impression.  Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, the majority wrote:  
Because the District Court erroneously relied on a lack of diligence, and because the 
Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an overly rigid per se approach, no lower court 
has yet considered in detail the facts of this case to determine whether they indeed 
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held that “professional misconduct . . . could nonetheless amount to 
egregious behavior and create an extraordinary circumstance that warrants 
equitable tolling”154 and that it could not “read Coleman as requiring a per se 
approach in this context.”155  With this in mind, the Court observed that 
Holland’s attorney failed to file a federal habeas petition despite Holland’s 
letters insisting that he do so, failed to research the proper filing date of the 
petition, failed to inform Holland about the ongoing proceedings in his case, 
and failed to communicate with Holland.156  Viewing these facts as a whole, 
the Court held that the conduct of Holland’s attorney might have been an 
extraordinary circumstance that properly excused Holland from meeting the 
one-year statute of limitations.157 
More important, however, was Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.158  
Noting that the majority had not established a criterion for determining what 
constitutes extraordinary circumstances,159 Justice Alito began to outline a 
rough standard of attorney abandonment that the Supreme Court eventually 
adopted in Maples v. Thomas.160  In so doing, Justice Alito noted that 
attorney negligence, whether ordinary or gross, “is not an extraordinary 
circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”161  Instead, he distinguished 
 
constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable relief . . . .  Thus, 
because we conclude that the District Court’s determination must be set aside, we leave it 
to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the facts in this record entitle Holland to 
equitable tolling, or whether further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, might 
indicate that respondent should prevail. 
Id. at 653–54.  Put differently, while the Supreme Court definitively held that AEDPA’s one-year 
statute of limitations, see supra note 140, is subject to equitable tolling, it declined to state whether 
the particular facts of the case satisfied the elements of equitable tolling.  See 39 AM. JUR. 2D, supra 
at § 121 (describing how a habeas petitioner establishes equitable tolling).  
 154. Holland, 560 U.S. at 651. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 652. 
 157. Id. at 652–54. 
 158. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the majority opinion in Maples, which adopts Justice 
Alito’s reasoning from his concurring opinion in Holland. 
 159. Holland, 560 U.S. at 654 (Alito, J. concurring); see also supra note 154 and accompanying 
text.  
 160. Holland, 560 U.S. at 559–60 (Alito, J., concurring); see also infra Part III.B.  
 161. Holland, 560 U.S. at 655 (Alito, J. concurring).  Justice Alito noted that making a boundary 
distinguishing between ordinary and gross negligence would establish “a basis for arguing that 
tolling is appropriate in almost every counseled case involving a missed deadline.”  Id. at 658.  He 
predicted that this would not only burden the federal district courts but would also make the 
availability of tolling reliant upon “the highly artificial distinction between gross and ordinary 
negligence.”  Id. 
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gross negligence from attorney abandonment and found that the difference 
was paramount.162  He reasoned that while “attorney negligence, however 
styled, does not provide a basis for equitable tolling . . . attorney misconduct 
that is not constructively attributable to the petitioner” is an extraordinary 
circumstance that justifies equitable tolling.163  “Common sense,” he argued, 
“dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the 
conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful 
sense of that word.”164  Finding that Holland’s attorney abandoned him, 
Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Holland’s one-year 
habeas corpus deadline could be equitably tolled.165 
B. Maples v. Thomas 
The Supreme Court returned to a similar issue in Maples v. Thomas,166 
wherein the Court explicitly adopted Justice Alito’s concurrence from 
Holland outlining attorney abandonment as the new governing standard.167  
Cory R. Maples was a death-row inmate in Alabama who was represented in 
his postconviction proceedings by two attorneys who worked at the same 
law firm and were serving pro bono.168  During the pendency of these 
proceedings in Alabama state court, both of the attorneys left their firm, 
thereby ending their representation of Maples.169  Neither attorney told 
Maples or the Alabama trial court that they would no longer be representing 
him, nor did they appoint substitute counsel to take over his 
representation.170  Consequently, when the Alabama trial court denied 
Maples’ petition for postconviction relief and mailed copies of the order to 
the law firm, the orders were returned to the clerk of the Alabama court 
unopened.171  This resulted in Maples missing the deadline to appeal the 
 
 162. Id. at 658–59. 
 163. Id. at 659 (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented to the majority ruling on the grounds that a 
close reading of AEDPA precludes any concept of equitable tolling and that Holland would not 
qualify for it even if it were not precluded.  Id. at 660–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 166. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 167. See infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text. 
 168. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 918.  
 169. Id. at 919. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 919–20.    
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Alabama trial court’s ruling through no fault of his own.172  Thereafter, 
Maples petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.173  Both the 
district court and the Eleventh Circuit denied his petition on the grounds that 
Maples’ failure to appeal the trial court’s order meant that he had not 
exhausted his procedural remedies in Alabama state court.174 
The Supreme Court reversed both the district court’s and Eleventh 
Circuit’s rulings and held that Maples should not be bound by his procedural 
default in the Alabama state court.175  The Court, citing Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Holland, reasoned that “under agency principles, a client 
cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 
abandoned him”176 and that an attorney who has abandoned his client has 
“severed the principal-agent relationship.”177  The Court, though, was still 
careful to note that the general rule established in Coleman that clients were 
bound by the acts of their attorneys still governed.178  Thus, the Court, once 
again citing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holland, recognized that there is 
an “essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however 
egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his 
client.”179  Applying this newly-formed standard to Maples’ situation, the 
Court concluded that Maples was effectively abandoned by the two 
attorneys because they did not tell Maples they would no longer be 
representing him, they did not seek permission to withdraw from 
representation, and they did not appoint substitute counsel to take their place 
as representatives of Maples.180 
IV. ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT 
The combined Holland and Maples decisions, therefore, definitively 
established an exception for attorney abandonment in the factual contexts of 
 
 172. Id. at 920. 
 173. Id. at 921. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 927–28. 
 176. Id. at 924. 
 177. Id. at 922–23. 
 178. Id. at 922. 
 179. Id. at 923.  This is referring to the difference between gross attorney negligence and attorney 
abandonment.  See id. 
 180. Id. at 924–26. 
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postconviction proceedings for two criminal defendants.181  At first glance, 
this may seem like the Court only meant for attorney abandonment to apply 
in the criminal context.182  This is incorrect: The Supreme Court likely 
intended and expected the attorney abandonment doctrine to spread to the 
civil realm.183  This is true for two principal reasons.184 
First, and most apparently, the Court never specifically limited its 
holdings to the criminal context.185  In fact, the Court did not reference 
“defendants” or “criminals” being abandoned by their attorneys, but instead 
repeatedly referrenced “clients,” “petitioners,” and “litigants.”186  None of 
these terms are confined to parties in criminal proceedings.187  One would 
think that if the Court had wanted to limit the concept of attorney 
abandonment to criminal defendants, it would have been much more explicit 
in doing so.188 
 
 181. See supra notes 139–80 and accompanying text. 
 182. Put differently, some people might initially think the Court intended this to be a very narrow 
holding. 
 183. See infra notes 185–98.  While the Supreme Court probably meant for attorney abandonment 
to be available in civil cases, it did not necessarily mean for Rule 60(b)(6) to be universally available 
as a remedy for attorney abandonment.  This is a distinct difference: civil cases could plausibly 
implicate attorney abandonment without implicating Rule 60(b)(6).  However, the consequence of 
the availability of attorney abandonment in the civil arena is that Rule 60(b)(6) is always available as 
a remedy.  This argument is taken up in more detail in Parts V–VI. 
 184. See infra notes 185–98. 
 185. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647–53 (2010); Holland, 
560 U.S. at 654–60 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 186. See, e.g., Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–23 (“A markedly different situation is presented, 
however, when an attorney abandons his client without notice . . . .  Having severed the principal-
agent relationship, an attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 923 (“In a concurring opinion in Holland, Justice Alito homed in on . . . 
[when] an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.” (emphasis added)); id. at 924 (“[U]nder 
agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 
abandoned him.” (emphasis added)); Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (“[A] petitioner ‘must “bear the risk 
of attorney error.”’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); id. at 659 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“Common sense dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the conduct of 
an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 187. A client is “[a] person or entity that employs a professional for advice or help in that 
professional’s line of work.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 289 (9th ed. 2009).  A petitioner is “[a] 
party who presents a petition to a court or other official body, esp. when seeking relief on appeal.”  
Id. at 1262.  A litigant is “[a] party to a lawsuit.”  Id. at 1017.  Notably, none of these terms are 
limited to criminal contexts.  See id. at 289, 1017, 1262.  
 188. This is especially true given the Court’s language in Maples that there should not be a 
distinction between equitable tolling contexts and procedural default contexts when considering the 
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Second, and most importantly, even though Holland and Maples were 
rooted in the criminal procedure context, the proceedings in which these 
cases arose were governed by the same standard that governs attorney 
misconduct in civil cases: the relationship-based model.189  The 
performance-based model only controls in cases where a defendant is 
guaranteed the right to counsel.190  Because a defendant is not guaranteed the 
right to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings or in state collateral 
attack proceedings191—the proceedings at issue in Holland and Maples192—
claims alleging attorney misconduct in these contexts are tested using the 
relationship-based model.193  This same model controls in civil cases because 
parties to civil proceedings are also not guaranteed counsel.194  Therefore, 
because the Supreme Court explicitly outlined attorney abandonment in a 
proceeding governed by the relationship-based model, it would seem 
obvious that the Court expected attorney abandonment to be available in all 
proceedings governed by the relationship-based model,195 including 
proceedings implicating Rule 60(b)(6).196  Put differently, the important 
distinction is between situations where there is and is not a right to counsel, 
not between criminal and civil proceedings.197  Again, if the Court had 
wanted the distinction to be between criminal and civil cases, it would have 
likely said so.198 
Consequently, the Supreme Court likely intended to establish attorney 
abandonment as a concept that must be recognized in both civil and criminal 
contexts that implicate the relationship-based model.199  If so, every circuit 
 
difference between gross negligence and attorney abandonment.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923 n.7.  In 
other words, because the Supreme Court analogized equitable tolling cases to cases of procedural 
default, and because Rule 60(b)(6) is a remedy that can cure procedural defaults, it is quite 
reasonable to assume that elements applicable to equitable tolling cases are equally applicable to 
Rule 60(b)(6) cases.  See id. 
 189. See infra text accompanying notes 190–94. 
 190. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 191. See supra note 34. 
 192. See supra notes 139–52, 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 194. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 195. See supra note 188.  See generally Zupac, supra note 22 (outlining the relationship-based 
model and when it applies). 
 196. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332. 
 198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text; see also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 
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court must now recognize attorney abandonment in the civil arena in some 
way or another because Supreme Court precedent constitutes mandatory 
authority that the courts of appeals must follow.200 
V. SOLVING THE SPLIT: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN RULE 60(b)(6) AND 
ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT IN LIGHT OF HOLLAND AND MAPLES 
The interesting consequence of mandating that circuit courts recognize 
attorney abandonment in civil cases will be how attorney abandonment will 
eventually come up in such contexts.  While the Supreme Court ruled on 
what attorney abandonment is and that lower courts must acknowledge it, it 
did not mandate how the circuit courts must apply it.201  With just a few 
logical steps, however, this Article will show that there is one consequence 
that must necessarily exist because of attorney abandonment even though the 
 
924 (2012). 
 200.  Of course, one could make the argument that there are other distinct differences between 
civil and criminal proceedings that would make the Holland and Maples attorney abandonment 
standard inapplicable in the civil context.  For instance, litigants in civil cases generally stand to lose 
money if they do not prevail, whereas defendants in criminal cases lose their liberty and ability to 
live freely if they do not prevail.  The latter is clearly a more worrisome result, so one could argue 
that the Supreme Court only had criminal contexts in mind when deciding Holland and Maples 
because the Court would realize it is more important to have a remedy for attorney abandonment in a 
criminal context than in a civil context.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s consistent use of the 
relationship-based model in postconviction relief proceedings—the same model it uses in the civil 
realm—prior to Holland and Maples weighs heavily against such an interpretation.  See supra notes 
189–98 and accompanying text. 
  One could likewise argue that, even if the Supreme Court did intend to have attorney 
abandonment apply in civil contexts, this is not mandatory authority that lower courts must follow 
because the Court never explicitly stated such a rule in either of its opinions.  A “mandatory rule,” 
however, is “[a] legal rule that is not subject to a contrary agreement,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1446 (9th ed. 2009), and the embedded term “rule” is “an established and authoritative standard or 
principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Here, the Supreme Court’s likely intention of having attorney abandonment 
apply in civil cases, although not explicitly stated, can be considered a “principle” or “guiding 
conduct” that can be distilled as a logical conclusion from what the court did explicitly state.  In 
other words—and in accordance with the definition of “mandatory rule”—necessary conclusions that 
derive from stated rules have the same power and authority as the stated rules themselves.  
Therefore, as long as lower courts can correctly reach this same conclusion about the Supreme 
Court’s intent regarding attorney abandonment—if they do not, these courts may very well be 
applying incorrect law—this intent is necessarily mandatory authority. 
 201. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24 (outlining attorney abandonment but omitting any 
discussion of how lower courts must apply it). 
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Supreme Court did not address that consequence.202  Namely, if a civil court 
determines that a party was abandoned by his attorney, that court must have 
the power to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).203  
To start, consider the Supreme Court’s statement in Maples that “a 
client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 
abandoned him,”204 which is a strict and explicit mandate.205  In essence, the 
Court is saying that when attorney abandonment exists, there must be some 
type of remedy for the client that immunizes him from any judgment against 
him.206  If this were not the case, and it was not a requirement that there must 
be some type of remedy for the client, the result would be inconsistent with 
what the Maples Court held because it would not make sense for a court to 
be unable to provide complete relief for an abandoned party if it is true that 
an abandoned party “cannot be charged” with the acts of his attorney.207 
Although a court must necessarily provide complete relief to an 
abandoned client, the client must conform with, and is constrained by, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when seeking such relief.208  Notably, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure list three ways that a client could 
potentially obtain complete relief from the conduct of her attorney: Rule 
55(c),209 Rule 59,210 and Rule 60(b)(6).211 
Rule 60(b) gives a court the power to vacate judgments, orders, or 
proceedings.212  Rule 55(c), on the other hand, states that a “court may set 
aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a default 
judgment under Rule 60(b).”213  As illustrated by some of the cases in Part 
II.C above,214 many cases of attorney abandonment involve default 
judgments, so, at first glance, Rule 55(c) would seem to be an ideal 
 
 202. See infra notes 204–32 and accompanying text. 
 203. See infra notes 204–32 and accompanying text. 
 204. 132 S. Ct. at 924 (emphasis added).   
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. 
 208. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in 
the United States district courts . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying notes 204–07. 
 209. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). 
 210. FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
 212. Id.; see also supra Part II.B. 
 213. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).  
 214. See supra Part II.C. 
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mechanism for relief in such situations.215 
But two main problems with Rule 55(c) exist that make it insufficient as 
a remedy for attorney abandonment.216  First, an entry of default is different 
than a default judgment,217 and Rule 55(c) makes a distinction between the 
two.218  As such, “good cause” is not enough for a court to set aside a default 
judgment; instead, it must use Rule 60(b).219  Second, even if the argument 
could be made that a default judgment could be set aside for good cause, 
there has been no indication by the Supreme Court that situations of attorney 
abandonment must involve default judgments.220  Granted, many cases of 
attorney abandonment involve default judgments,221 but this is not an explicit 
requirement.222  These two problems show that Rule 55(c) cannot be used in 
every situation,223 which goes against the unyielding Maples mandate that 
clients “cannot be charged” with the conduct of attorneys that abandoned 
them.224  On the other hand, satisfying the requirements of Rule 60(b) is 
more difficult than satisfying the requirements of “good cause,” so Rule 
60(b)(6) could be used to set aside both default judgments and entries of 
default.225  For this reason, Rule 60(b) is not solely limited to certain 
 
 215. See supra Part II.C. 
 216. See infra notes 217–26 and accompanying text. 
 217. See William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes “Good Cause” Allowing Federal 
Court to Relieve Party of His Default Under Rule 55(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 
A.L.R. FED. 7 § 2[a] (1976) (“[T]he majority of courts have recognized that Rule 55(c) ‘good cause’ 
is a standard exclusively governing requests for relief from default entries, the grounds enumerated 
in Rule 60(b) becoming applicable when the default has ripened into a default judgment which is 
sought to be set aside.” (emphasis added)). 
 218. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922–24 (2012) (omitting any discussion of a 
procedural default requirement). 
 221. See, e.g., cases cited supra Part II.C. 
 222. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24.  
 223. Specifically, it could not be used in situations of attorney abandonment where there was no 
default judgment.  This could occur, for example, if an attorney did not communicate with a client or 
respond to court documents for months at a time but still showed up at a hearing on a motion to 
dismiss and lost.  This would not be a default judgment because the attorney showed up at the 
hearing; however, a good argument could still be made that the attorney had abandoned the client by 
his previous lack of diligence and communication.  
 224. 132 S. Ct. at 924. 
 225. In other words, if a party were to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b), that party would 
necessarily satisfy the requirements of “good cause.”  See Danne, supra note 217, § 2[a] (“[C]ourts 
have generally acknowledged that ‘good cause’ is a broader and more liberal standard than anything 
found in Rule 60(b), and that, consequently, something less may be required to warrant the opening 
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situations in the way that Rule 55(c) is.226 
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 gives a court the 
power to “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues” that are in dispute.227  
In theory, this could completely relieve an abandoned client from the 
conduct of his attorney: the client could get a new lawyer; obtain a new, 
different verdict; and not be bound by the unfair initial verdict.228  Rule 59, 
however, is plagued by the same problem that plagues Rule 55(c): there is 
no requirement that attorney abandonment can only be alleged at trial.229  For 
this reason, Rule 60(b) is the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that can 
guarantee in all situations that a client will not be bound by the acts of his 
attorney.230 
Therefore, if a civil court finds that an attorney has abandoned his client, 
 
of an entry of default than would be necessary to set aside a default judgment.”). 
 226. See id.  One could also make the argument that courts could use Rule 55(c) for instances of 
default and use Rule 60(b)(6) when a default is not at issue.  If so, the Maples requirement that a 
client “cannot be charged” with the acts of his attorney would still be satisfied, albeit through two 
separate, combined mechanisms.  Such an approach, however, is inappropriate: This Article is 
alleging that judgments must be vacated if there is attorney abandonment, and Rule 55(c) explicitly 
makes a distinction between defaults and default judgments.  As stated above, one can only use the 
“good cause” standard of Rule 55(c) if a default is at issue, not a default judgment.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 217–19.  As such, even if a court wanted to utilize Rule 55(c) in cases of 
default judgments, the text of Rule 55(c) would direct the court to utilize Rule 60(b) instead and not 
to use the “good cause” standard.  Therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) remains the sole tool that can be used to 
vacate judgments tainted by attorney abandonment. 
 227. FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922–24 (2012) (omitting any discussion of a 
procedural default requirement or the necessity of a trial). 
 230. See supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text.  An additional reason—although outside the 
scope of this Article—that Rule 59 cannot always be used is because of its time requirement.  Rule 
59 allows for a new trial only if a motion is filed 28 days after the entry of the judgment.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 59.  As shown above in note 64, though, Rule 60(b)(6) and the extraordinary circumstances 
test are invoked only after a year has passed since a judgment has been entered.  Furthermore, as 
seen by the vast majority of the cases discussed in this Article, allegations of attorney abandonment 
are usually brought a year after judgment.  Thus, by the time clients realize that they are entitled to 
relief from judgment on the grounds of attorney abandonment—usually later than a year after 
judgment—the time to bring a Rule 59 motion will almost always have long since passed and Rule 
60(b)(6) will be the only avenue for relief.  In the event that a client alleges attorney abandonment 
after 28 days but within a year of judgment being entered, other provisions of Rule 60(b)—
specifically, Rule 60(b)(1)—can be used to vacate the judgment instead of Rule 60(b)(6).  In the 
unlikely scenario that an allegation of attorney abandonment is brought within 28 days after a 
judgment is entered, either Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 59 could apply.  However, as also stated in note 64, 
time requirements are not within the scope of this Article, so it will be assumed that Rule 60(b)(6) 
will apply regardless of whether a litigant brings a claim within a year. 
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that court must necessarily have the power to use Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate 
any judgment that has been rendered against that client.231  Because a client 
“cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 
abandoned him,” this is the only remedy that can guarantee a client complete 
relief from judgment in any situation—whether a default judgment, a trial, or 
something else entirely.232 
VI. CHANGES IN JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE CIRCUITS MUST MAKE 
As this Article has shown thus far, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
in Holland and Maples necessarily give each and every federal court the 
power to grant relief to abandoned clients in civil cases through Rule 
60(b)(6).233  As shown above, however,234 not all of the circuit courts had 
adopted such a view prior to these two decisions.235  Therefore, of the four 
different approaches that the circuit courts use, three require a shift in 
jurisprudence regarding Rule 60(b)(6) and its interaction with attorney 
misconduct.236 
A. The Gross Negligence Circuits 
The circuit courts that have adopted the view that an attorney’s gross 
negligence can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) must slightly change their 
jurisprudence.237  Specifically, these courts must acknowledge that attorney 
abandonment can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)—as they already do—but they must 
also acknowledge that gross negligence cannot satisfy it.238  This change 
comes from the Supreme Court’s holding in Maples that there is an 
 
 231. See supra notes 212–30 and accompanying text. 
 232. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; see also supra notes 212–30 and accompanying text.  To be sure, a 
court may choose to employ Rule 55(c) and Rule 59 as remedies in cases involving default 
judgments or trials.  However, in other proceedings—a motion for summary judgment, for 
instance—where the attorney has abandoned his client, neither 55(c) or Rule 59 could be utilized.  
Thus, a court must necessarily have Rule 60(b)(6) as a tool to vacate judgments because it is the only 
remedy available in situations where there has not been a default judgment or a trial. 
 233. See supra Parts IV–V. 
 234. See supra Part II.C. 
 235. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.4. 
 236. See infra Part VI.A–D. 
 237. See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
 238. See infra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
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“essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however egregious, 
and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.”239  In 
other words, the Court made a distinction between gross negligence and 
attorney abandonment, the necessary implication being that the latter 
satisfies Rule 60(b)(6) but that the former does not.240  As such, the “gross 
negligence” circuits must follow suit. 
Practically, this will have very little impact on the outcome of most 
cases in these circuits because what these courts consider gross negligence 
can often be labeled as attorney abandonment.241  Their case law, though, 
still must change in order to preclude a situation where an attorney was 
grossly negligent but could not reasonably be considered to have abandoned 
the client.242  For instance, reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tani.243  
In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the attorney at issue was grossly 
negligent and that his former client therefore deserved relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) because the attorney was almost completely non-responsive to the 
client.244  Importantly, the court noted that this non-responsiveness 
constituted conduct so grossly negligent that the attorney had “virtually 
abandoned” his client.245  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Holland and 
Maples, the Ninth Circuit would now have to say that the Tani attorney’s 
abandonment qualified his former client for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),246 but 
it could not say that the attorney’s gross negligence was a basis for relief.247  
This may seem like a nuanced distinction, but it is quite significant.  Had the 
attorney, for example, remained in constant contact with his client but filed 
court documents that were egregiously lacking in substance and preparation, 
an argument could be reasonably made that this qualified as being grossly 
negligent but not as attorney abandonment.  If this were the case, Rule 
60(b)(6) could not be used to remedy such conduct after the Supreme 
 
 239. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 
656–59 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 240. See supra Parts III, V. 
 241. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 242. See infra notes 243–48 and accompanying text. 
 243. Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002); see also supra Part II.C.1. 
 244. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1167, 1170. 
 245. Id. at 1170. 
 246. See supra Part V. 
 247. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (noting the difference between gross 
negligence and attorney abandonment).  
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Court’s decisions in Holland and Maples.248 
While this change in jurisprudence as required by Holland and Maples 
has at least been recognized in several recent decisions by the Ninth 
Circuit,249 the Ninth Circuit does not yet seem to appreciate the significance 
of this change.250  For example, in Mackey v. Hoffman,251 the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the Supreme Court in Maples held that there was a difference 
between negligence and attorney abandonment.252  However, the Mackey 
court went on to say that “when a federal habeas petitioner has been 
inexcusably and grossly neglected by his counsel in a manner amounting to 
attorney abandonment in every meaningful sense that has jeopardized the 
petitioner’s appellate rights, a district court may grant relief pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(6).”253  This is somewhat misleading: the Ninth Circuit is still trying to 
equate gross negligence with attorney abandonment, while Holland and 
Maples made it clear that there is a distinct separation between the two.254  
The “gross negligence” circuits still need to distinguish more completely the 
difference between gross negligence and attorney abandonment.255 
B. The No Relief Circuits 
Out of all the different circuit approaches, the approach taken by the 
 
 248. See id. 
 249. Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (Paez, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court [in Maples] relied on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holland v. Florida . . . to distinguish 
attorney negligence from abandonment.”); Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247, 1252–53 (9th Cir. 
2012); Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the distinction in Maples between 
negligence and attorney abandonment). 
 250. See infra text accompanying notes 252–54. 
 251. 682 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 252. Id. at 1252–53 (“The [Supreme] Court noted that, although an attorney is normally the 
prisoner’s agent, and the principal typically bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his 
agent under well-settled principles of agency law, ‘[a] markedly different situation is presented, 
however, when an attorney abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the default.’”). 
 253. Id. at 1253 (emphasis added).  It is interesting to note that the court in this case actually 
applied Rule 60(b)(6) in the context of a habeas corpus petitioner.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit was able to 
do this because the Supreme Court decided in Gonzalez v. Crosby that Rule 60(b)(6) can apply to 
habeas corpus proceedings.  545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (“Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role 
to play in habeas cases.”). 
 254. Compare Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1252–53, with Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012), 
and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 656–59 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 255. See Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1253 (discussing agency and client abandonment). 
[Vol. 42: 155, 2014] The Universal Remedy for Attorney Abandonment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
188 
Seventh Circuit is in the most obvious need of change.256  Specifically, the 
Seventh Circuit needs to overturn its prior holdings that attorney misconduct 
cannot satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).257  The interesting part is that it does not need 
to explicitly overrule any case in order to do so.258 
The reasoning for this is in the language the Seventh Circuit used in 
Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.259  The 
Seventh Circuit held in Bakery Machinery that “all of the attorney’s 
misconduct (except in the cases where the act is outside the scope of 
employment or in cases of excusable neglect) becomes the problem of the 
client.”260  Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled that attorney misconduct could 
never satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) unless an attorney was acting outside of his 
scope of authority for one reason or another.261  The Seventh Circuit, 
however, never once considered when or what actions would cause the 
attorney to “act . . . outside the scope of his employment.”262  To illustrate, it 
is as if the Seventh Circuit created a hole that, if filled, would allow a client 
to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for the acts of his attorney that were 
outside the scope of the attorney’s employment.263  The problem was that 
prior to Holland and Maples, the Seventh Circuit never had any instrument 
to fill this hole;264 indeed, it never even considered the possibility that 
attorney misconduct itself could sever the attorney-client employment 
 
 256. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 257. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 258. See infra notes 259–69 and accompanying text. 
 259. 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 260. Id. (emphasis added). 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. (omitting any discussion of what brings an attorney outside the scope of his 
employment). 
 263. See id. 
 264. The Seventh Circuit has actually identified a form of attorney abandonment, but it has only 
done so in situations where a defendant is guaranteed a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  
See Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A lawyer who deserts his client does 
not foist the burdens of self-representation on the defendant; instead the lawyer brings shame (and 
professional discipline) on himself, and the defendant is entitled to a new proceeding with the aid of 
a competent, ethical lawyer.” (emphasis added)).  As such, this form of attorney abandonment could 
never be used—and has never been used—as an instrument to fill the hole from Bakery Machinery; 
it was only brought up in the context of the performance-based model, so it cannot be utilized in 
contexts governed by the relationship-based model (such as civil cases).  See also Part II.A 
(describing the performance-based and relationship-based models, when they are used, and the 
crossover between them). 
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relationship.265 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Holland and Maples changes all of 
this.266  In these cases, the Court held that attorney abandonment severs the 
principal-agent relationship—that is, the attorney-client relationship.267  
Therefore, the hole established in Bakery Machinery now has an instrument 
to fill it: attorney abandonment.268  The result is that the Seventh Circuit does 
not actually need to change any of its case law in order to allow attorney 
abandonment to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because Bakery 
Machinery and the Holland and Maples decisions fit together like two pieces 
of a puzzle.269 
One recent Seventh Circuit decision actually alluded to the attorney 
abandonment standard outlined in Maples, but it did not answer whether it 
would satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).270  In Nash v. Hepp, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that “[i]n Maples counsel abandoned the petitioner without warning.”271  The 
Seventh Circuit, however, refused to decide whether abandonment applied 
because Maples had been decided after the district court’s decision in 
Nash.272  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit stated that “a change in law showing 
that a previous judgment may have been incorrect is not an ‘extraordinary 
circumstance’ justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”273  Even with this 
indecision, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgement of the 
Maples standard shows a potential shift in its jurisprudence toward a 
recognition that Rule 60(b)(6) must be available as a tool to remedy attorney 
abandonment.274 
 
 265. Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 848. 
 266. See infra notes 267–69 and accompanying text. 
 267. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 658–59 
(2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 268. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923; Holland, 560 U.S. at 659 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 269. Upon reflection, one wonders why the Seventh Circuit would leave such a blatant opening in 
its case law if, as has been proven, this opening had the potential to destroy the circuit’s intention to 
always bind clients with the conduct of their attorneys.  See Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 848. 
 270. See Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See id.; see also supra Part V (explaining why Rule 60(b)(6) is the universal remedy for 
attorney abandonment in civil cases). 
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C. The Strict Abandonment Circuits 
The “strict abandonment” circuits constitute the one approach to the 
interaction between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6) that does not 
need to change.275  These circuits hold that only attorney abandonment—not 
gross negligence—can provide a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),276 a 
philosophy which is in exact accordance with Holland and Maples.277  
Therefore, Holland and Maples have no real impact on these courts other 
than to reaffirm the fact that gross negligence cannot provide a basis for 
relief.278 
D. The Unclear Circuits 
Notably, up until Holland and Maples, the Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and 
Federal Circuits had never determined what would happen if a client tried to 
obtain relief from judgment by alleging attorney misconduct under Rule 
60(b)(6).279  After these two Supreme Court decisions, however, these 
circuits are forced to recognize that attorney abandonment qualifies a party 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).280  To illustrate, consider the case Solaroll 
Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc.,281 where the 
Eleventh Circuit held that it was not going to decide if an attorney’s gross 
negligence satisfied Rule 60(b)(6) because the attorney’s conduct in the case 
did not rise to that level and, therefore, the result would not matter.282  If this 
same case had been decided after Holland and Maples, the Eleventh Circuit 
would necessarily have had to hold that attorney abandonment—but not 
gross negligence—could warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) regardless of 
 
 275. See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 277. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (“In a concurring opinion in Holland, 
Justice [Alito] homed in on the essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however 
egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.” (citing Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 657–58 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 278. There have been no decisions thus far from either the Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, or 
Court of Federal Claims in light of Holland and Maples reaffirming the holdings that only attorney 
abandonment can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).  Nonetheless, as previously discussed, this is the only 
possible interpretation these courts could make.  See supra Part V. 
 279. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 280. See supra Part V. 
 281. 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986); see also supra Part II.C.4. 
 282. Solaroll Shade, 803 F.2d at 1133. 
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whether that result was of consequence to the facts at hand.283 
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has actually started to change its 
jurisprudence to reflect these new requirements set by Holland and 
Maples.284  In Cadet v. Florida Department of Corrections, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that “[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s Maples decision, we hold 
that attorney negligence, however gross or egregious, does not qualify as an 
‘extraordinary circumstance’ for purposes of equitable tolling; abandonment 
of the attorney-client relationship . . . is required.”285  Granted, this holding 
did not reference Rule 60(b)(6).286  Nonetheless, the fact that the Eleventh 
Circuit held that only attorney abandonment is an extraordinary 
circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling lends credence to the idea that 
it would also consider only attorney abandonment to be an extraordinary 
circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6).287  Regardless of the 
significance of this decision, though, all of the “unclear circuits” will 
eventually have to fully extend the holdings of Holland and Maples to 
 
 283. See supra Part V. 
 284. See Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 473, 481 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 285. Id.  In another case, the Eleventh Circuit considered a situation where a prisoner challenged 
the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.  Ryder v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 521 F. App’x 
817, 818 (11th Cir. 2013).  However, the Eleventh Circuit never got to the merits of the Rule 
60(b)(6) claim and whether attorney misconduct could satisfy it because it determined that the 
prisoner did not file the Rule 60(b)(6) motion within the proper statute of limitations.  Id. at 820.  
Although the court discussed Maples, attorney abandonment, and Rule 60(b)(6), it did so without 
considering how they interact with each other; the case, therefore, is not overly helpful in parsing out 
the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence post-Maples.  See id. 
 286. See Cadet, 742 F.3d at 481 (omitting any discussion of Rule 60(b)(6)). 
 287. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 n.7 (2012) (“Holland v. Florida involved tolling 
of a federal time bar, while Coleman v. Thompson concerned cause for excusing a procedural default 
in state court. We see no reason, however, why the distinction between attorney negligence and 
attorney abandonment should not hold in both contexts.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see 
also supra Part IV (discussing how the attorney-abandonment standard from Holland and Maples—a 
concept that was first formulated by Justice Alito in the equitable tolling context—applies in 
situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs); supra note 153 (discussing the definition and significance 
of equitable tolling). 
   The Federal Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit have reached holdings similar to the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court held 
in Maples and Holland that habeas petitioners may benefit from equitable tolling in cases of attorney 
abandonment, and this court concludes that the same protection extends to veterans.”); Manning v. 
Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 184 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “attorney abandonment can qualify as an 
extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes”); Ulrey v. Zavaras, 483 F. App’x 536, 
541 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Maples in holding that equitable tolling applies “when a habeas 
petitioner’s failure to file timely objections is occasioned by counsel’s unnoticed abandonment of the 
case”). 
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situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs.288 
VII.  SOME POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY HOLLAND AND 
MAPLES 
As noted above in Part V, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Holland and 
Maples effectively require that Rule 60(b)(6) must always be available as a 
tool to cure attorney abandonment in civil cases.289  This result creates two 
important consequences that need to be addressed.290 
First, the holdings from Holland and Maples form an inherent tension 
with the language of Rule 60(b)(6).291  Rule 60(b)(6) says a “court may 
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for “any 
other reason that justifies relief,”292 but, as shown above, the consequence of 
Holland and Maples is that courts must grant relief in some way when it 
finds attorney abandonment.293  Obviously, this is not entirely consistent. 
The easiest way to reconcile this difference would be to create a 
statutory analogue to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Holland and Maples.  
The way Rule 60(b)(6) is currently written makes it seem as though courts 
have the ability to decline relief to clients who were abandoned by their 
attorneys.294  Some court could conceivably reference the language in 
60(b)(6)—that is, the language saying a “court may relieve a party” from 
judgment—to justify a ruling that it could still hold an abandoned client 
liable for the acts of her attorney.295  In order to avoid such a situation and to 
remain faithful to Holland and Maples, Congress should consider 
implementing a permanent statutory exception that requires courts to vacate 
 
 288. See supra Part V. 
 289. See supra Part V. 
 290. See infra notes 291–301 and accompanying text. 
 291. Compare Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924 (holding that abandoned clients can never be bound by 
their attorney’s actions), and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659–60 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(same), with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (granting courts the discretion to vacate judgments). 
 292. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
 293. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; Holland, 560 U.S. at 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring).  Relief could 
be granted under Rule 55(c) if the underlying judgment was a default judgment or under Rule 59 if 
the underlying judgment occurred at a trial, but FRCP 60(b)(6) is the only mechanism that can 
always grant relief.  See supra Part V.  
 294. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
 295. See id. (emphasis added).  Because statutory language is generally superior to case law, this 
is not an entirely implausible situation. 
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a judgment or order in some way if it finds that the attorney abandoned the 
client.  Such a statute would preclude any court from ever trying to deny 
relief to an abandoned client. 
Second, even though Holland and Maples definitively created an 
exception for attorney abandonment, the Supreme Court did not describe in 
great detail how lower courts should go about distinguishing gross 
negligence from attorney abandonment.296  To be sure, all the Court said was 
that attorney abandonment severs the attorney-client relationship.297  Beyond 
that, it only noted evidence from the specific cases in front of it that tended 
to show attorney abandonment existed.298 
For instance, in Holland, Justice Alito found that abandonment existed 
as “evidenced by counsel’s near-total failure to communicate with petitioner 
or to respond to petitioner’s many inquiries and requests over a period of 
several years.”299  Does this mean that communication between the client and 
attorney is the main factor that matters in abandonment?  Or could there be a 
situation where a client is still in regular contact with his attorney but could 
still be considered abandoned?  Furthermore, Justice Alito also thought 
abandonment occurred in Holland partially due to the fact that the client 
“made reasonable efforts to terminate counsel due to his inadequate 
representation.”300  In situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs, does this 
mean that all clients must be reasonably diligent in trying to either contact 
his attorney or end the attorney’s representation, or is this factor limited to 
habeas corpus petitioners alone?  Granted, finding attorney abandonment is 
inherently a fact-heavy analysis,301 but this is an area of law that will need to 
be more fully fleshed out by the circuit courts in the near future.302  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court may even find itself revisiting the topic in order to more 
clearly define the differences between gross negligence and attorney 
abandonment. 
 
 296. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923 (omitting any detailed discussion of how lower courts should go 
about determining attorney abandonment); Holland, 560 U.S. at 658–60 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(same). 
 297. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923–24; Holland, 560 U.S. at 658–60 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 298. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24; Holland, 560 U.S. 654–60 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 299. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1363. 
 302. See supra Part VI.A–D. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Holland and Maples are 
godsends for clients unfortunate enough to be burdened with attorneys who, 
for one reason or another, are so lacking in their representation that their 
actions cannot be fairly attributed to the client.303  Without explicitly doing 
so, the Supreme Court cured a four-way circuit split in a manner that will 
allow abandoned clients to be released from the shackles of any undeserved 
judgments against them.304  No longer will parties to a civil lawsuit have no 
recourse to turn to once their attorney’s misconduct causes them loss and 
damages.305  Instead, once every circuit comes to acknowledge that Rule 
60(b)(6) is always available as a remedy for attorney abandonment, these 
parties will have a potential avenue for relief.306  As a result, American law 
will move one small step closer toward its goal of enacting justice in 
everything that it does.307  So, the next time you are in a car accident, sued 
for negligence, and abandoned by your attorney, rest assured knowing that 
you will not have to pay that $50,000 judgment308—unless, of course, you 
were actually at fault. 
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